Give and Take? Procedure, Practicalities, and Policy in Naturalization Appellate Jurisdiction by Frobisher, Kelsey
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 67 Number 3 
2015 
Give and Take? Procedure, Practicalities, and Policy in 
Naturalization Appellate Jurisdiction 
Kelsey Frobisher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kelsey Frobisher, Give and Take? Procedure, Practicalities, and Policy in Naturalization Appellate 
Jurisdiction, 67 OKLA. L. REV. (2015), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss3/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
 
559 
Give and Take?  Procedure, Practicalities, and Policy in 
Naturalization Appellate Jurisdiction 
“Naturalization is an act of great personal consequence to American 
Immigrants, involving major reorganizations in their sense of identity and 
offering a new beginning for many. Accordingly, the Committee 
emphasizes that the paramount consideration of this legislation and its 
implementation should be the applicants.”1 
These words, from a 1989 House Report on the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, provide a clear and significant reminder of the import of 
naturalization—a matter not simply of being a resident of the United States 
of America, but of becoming an American citizen. They remind us of what 
is at stake in conversations about naturalization—the identities, 
relationships, and aspirations of individuals who have relocated their lives 
and reoriented their very selves to become American.  
The road to citizenship is complex and exacting,2 and Congress has 
shown an intent to allow federal courts to aid in this valuable process. 
Nonetheless, there exists a deep circuit split over immigration proceedings 
and federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the divide centers upon 
the effect of a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(Immigration Services) request to a district court to defer to pending 
removal proceedings by dismissing an alien’s pending naturalization 
appeal.  
Circuits have responded in four different ways, and in Klene v. 
Napolitano the Seventh Circuit issued the most recent decision on the 
issue.3 The Klene court briefly discussed each potential approach before 
adopting the Third Circuit’s stance that no such dismissal is required 
because “subject-matter jurisdiction continues and . . . a remedy is 
possible—a declaratory judgment of entitlement to citizenship.”4  
Competing with this declaratory-judgment approach are the approaches 
that other circuits have adopted. These alternative views include the 
mootness-doctrine approach of the Tenth Circuit5; the lack-of-jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Zaranska v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 400 F. Supp. 2d 500, 510-11 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 11 (1989)). 
 2. 135 CONG. REC. 16996 (1989) (statement of Rep. Brooks) (“Once applicants have 
made their way through the mysterious Immigration and Naturalization Service procedure, 
their path to citizenship is delayed once again. . . . I urge my fellow [m]embers to join me in 
making naturalization an enriching rather than discouraging experience . . . .”) 
 3. 697 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 4. Id. at 668. 
 5. Awe v. Napolitano, 494 F. App’x 860 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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approach of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits6; and the failure-of-relief 
approach of the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.7 
Because Congress exhibited an intent for the judiciary to hold review 
power over naturalization applications, and because the preservation of this 
review power is consistent with a healthy immigration system, a proper 
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1421 will grant courts the jurisdiction to hear 
naturalization appeals under a de novo standard of review. 
I. Background and History: Shifting Structures Cause Confusion 
Relatively recent developments in immigration law have given rise to the 
interpretive question at issue in Klene and related cases. The structure of 
U.S. immigration agencies and processes has seen significant change within 
the last seventy years, and discussions of the system must acknowledge its 
complex and multifaceted nature. There is no single federal agency or 
department governing immigration, but rather, the Department of 
Homeland Security (Homeland Security), the Department of Justice, the 
Department of State, the Department of Labor, and the Department of 
Health and Human Services all play a part in defining and maintaining the 
field.8  
Homeland Security involves three separate agencies in immigration 
matters: Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.9 At the most basic level, 
Customs and Border Protection regulate traffic into and out of the United 
States, while Immigration and Customs Enforcement enforces immigration-
related laws within the country’s border.10 Immigration Services, on the 
other hand, is the Homeland Security agency that governs benefits, status, 
and naturalization11 and is, therefore, the agency that oversees the type of 
proceedings involved in Klene and its sister cases.  
Immigration Services is one of two Homeland Security agencies that 
entirely replaced the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 2010); Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 
337 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 7. Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008); De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 
F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 8. Janet B. Beck, Immigration Law: Myths and Realities, HOUS. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 
2009, at 8, 9. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
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2003.12 The 2003 restructuring is significant for both theoretical and 
practical reasons. First, following the change, “backlogs and processing 
delays have reached . . . ‘unprecedented levels,’” causing significant 
adverse effects for immigrants, businesses, and families.13 This was a 
matter of concern in Klene and similar cases where agency action could 
keep potential plaintiffs in a state of unreviewable limbo regarding their 
status.14 Second, some advocates have identified a “culture of no” within 
Immigration Services following the restructuring.15 Third, the Title VIII 
statutes in question, along with the court cases interpreting these statutes, 
refer to the Attorney General as the head of the naturalizing and removing 
agency.16 Technically, such cases should now be addressed to the Secretary 
of Homeland Security.17 Nonetheless, most texts discussing the issue—
including recent case law—have continued the convention of referring to 
the attorney general to indicate Immigration Services as an agency and 
party to proceedings.18 This Comment will follow the same convention. 
A. Relevant Statutes Supply Granting and Limiting Language 
Klene and its counterpart cases wrestle with the relationship between 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1421(c) and 1429 as amended in 1990.19 Both statutes speak to 
the review of naturalization applications, and their amended language has 
left their interaction in a state of confusion.20  
Section 1421(c) (Granting Statute) grants the right of judicial review to 
individuals whose naturalization applications have been denied by 
Immigration Services, stating that these individuals: 
[M]ay seek review of such denial before the United States 
district court for the district in which such person resides . . . . 
Such review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Peter M. Isbister, Current Developments, Developments in the Executive Branch, 18 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 595 (2004). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 260-61 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  
 15. Isbister, supra note 12, at 596. 
 16. See Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 231 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 17. Id.  
 18. See, e.g., id. 
 19. See, e.g., Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 20. Id. 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request 
of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on the application.21 
In short, through this Granting Section Congress gave the federal court 
system valid subject-matter jurisdiction over final Immigration Services 
denials of immigrants’ naturalization applications.22  
The second relevant statute, § 1429 (Limiting Section) prevents the 
attorney general from deciding a naturalization application while a removal 
proceeding is ongoing: “[N]o application of naturalization shall be 
considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant 
a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest . . . .”23 Thus, the 
attorney general’s power to review applications is expressly limited. 
The language of these statute sections appeared in the 1990 update from 
the original Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, under which 
courts maintained sole authority over naturalization and the Attorney 
General held the authority to remove aliens.24 As courts have explained, 
“[T]his bifurcation of authority sometimes led to ‘a race between the alien 
to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to deport him.’”25 
Consequently, Congress enacted the Limiting Section to address this 
situation by preventing action on a naturalization application until removal 
proceedings were closed, effectively prioritizing such removal 
proceedings.26 
B. Courts Now Face an Interpretive Challenge 
The challenge facing courts attempting to navigate the interaction 
between the Granting and Limiting Sections results from ambiguities this 
amendment introduced. With the 1990 update, Congress intended to 
increase efficiency and decrease adverse district-court docket effects.27 This 
                                                                                                                 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2012). 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. § 1429. 
 24. Jessica Schneider, Comment, Waiting to Be an American: The Courts’ Proper Role 
and Function in Alleviating Naturalization Applicants’ Woes in 8 U.S.C. § 1447(B) Actions, 
29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 581, 584-86 (2010). 
 25. Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 544 (1955)); see also Ajlani v. Chertoff, 
545 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 26. Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 236. 
 27. See, 135 CONG. REC. 16995 (1989) (statement of Rep. Morrison) (“This legislation, 
while technical in nature, addresses a very substantial concern . . . and that is the problem of 
long backlogs in moving through the naturalization process . . . .”); Etape v. Chertoff, 497 
F.3d 379, 386 (4th Cir. 2007).  
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modification granted the Attorney General sole authority over 
naturalizations and redefined the court’s role in the process.28 The 
amendment also allowed district courts de novo review power over 
naturalizations that the Attorney General denied or upon which the 
Attorney General failed to make a determination within 120 days.29 To 
reflect these changes in the respective roles of the courts and the Attorney 
General, Congress amended the Limiting Section’s language. Where the 
section previously stated that “no petition for naturalization shall be finally 
heard by a naturalization court if there is pending against the petitioner a 
deportation proceeding,”30 it now states that “no application for 
naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General” if removal 
proceedings are pending.31  
These gradual adjustments to the naturalization and removal processes 
created uncertainty. 
1. Proper Application of 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) 
One example of this uncertainty is the contention surrounding how 8 
C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (Declaration Regulation) ought to apply. That 
regulation, originally dating back to 2003, provides that even when removal 
proceedings are open, an immigration judge may terminate them—thereby 
allowing the immigrant to move to a final hearing on her naturalization 
application—when that immigrant “has established prima facie eligibility 
for naturalization and the matter involves exceptionally appealing or 
humanitarian factors.”32 In 1975, the Board of Immigration appeals 
determined that for purposes of this regulation,33 an immigrant could 
establish prima facie eligibility only by an “affirmative communication 
from [Homeland Security] or by a declaration of a court that the alien 
would be eligible for naturalization but for the pendency of the deportation 
proceedings or the existence of an outstanding order of deportation.”34 The 
Board of Immigration Appeals further determined that neither the Board 
itself nor immigration judges could make this affirmative declaration due to 
                                                                                                                 
 28. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (2012). 
 29. Id. §§ 1421(c), 1447(b). 
 30. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1952) (emphasis added). 
 31. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 32. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2014). 
 33. Actually, a preceding, but nearly identical regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 242.7(a) (1975). 
 34. Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 804 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Cruz, 15 I. & N. 
Dec. 236, 237 (B.I.A. 1975)). 
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a lack of “authority with respect to the naturalization of aliens.”35 This 
language suggests that the federal court’s naturalization authority may be 
the reason the Board of Immigration Appeals also considered the courts 
capable of offering affirmative declarations.  
When Congress updated the statute and transferred the powers of 
naturalization to the attorney general in 1990, it became unclear whether 
courts retained the capacity to offer these affirmative declarations of prima 
facie eligibility for naturalization.36 The Board of Immigration Appeals 
offered its stance in In re Hidalgo in 2007.37 There the Board held that only 
Homeland Security could provide the type of affirmative communication 
required to terminate removal proceedings under the Declaration 
Regulation.38  
Then in 2010, the Fourth Circuit joined the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ In re Hidalgo determination that federal courts may no longer 
make affirmative declarations of eligibility for naturalization.39 To reach 
this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit held that the Board had correctly 
interpreted and applied the Declaration Regulation against the updated 
statutory scheme and that the regulation was not inconsistent with the 
relevant statute, namely the Granting Section.40 
This Board of Immigration Appeals’s interpretation has not gone without 
criticism, however. In contrast with the Fourth Circuit, the Third Circuit 
held in 2012 that federal courts are, indeed, competent to make declarations 
of prima facie eligibility for naturalization.41 The Third Circuit concluded 
that allowing courts to issue declaratory judgments as valid relief in denied 
naturalization appeals was not only consistent with the Granting Section but 
was required by Congress’ clear intent to provide federal courts with 
exactly this type of de novo review power.42 The question then becomes: 
was the Third Circuit—and the other circuit courts that have reached the 
same conclusion—correct in asserting that valid jurisdiction to hear 
naturalization appeals is, in fact, the proper interpretation of congressional 
intent as expressed in the Granting and Limiting Sections of Title VIII? 
  
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 804-05. 
 37. 24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 38. Id. at 106. 
 39. Barnes, 625 F.3d at 806-07.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 42. Id. 
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2. Proper Interpretation of the Granting and Limiting Sections 
In addition to the lingering questions about the judiciary’s capacity to 
make prima facie declarations, ambiguity as to congressional priorities and 
the scope of valid jurisdiction continues to result from the statutory 
amendments.43 These uncertainties have led to continuing difficulties 
surrounding the role of courts in situations involving both de novo review 
of denied naturalization and open removal proceedings,44 and it is on these 
ambiguities that this Comment will focus.  
  Specifically, courts addressing the issue have asked the following: (1) 
does the current statutory language preserve the INA’s original 
prioritization of removal proceedings over naturalization proceedings45; (2) 
does the statutory prohibition upon the attorney general’s consideration of 
naturalization applications during open removal proceedings similarly 
prohibit courts from acting46; and (3) if courts retain the power to act upon 
naturalization applications, do open removal proceedings limit the types of 
relief available?47 Circuit courts have greatly varied in their answers to 
these questions, resulting in a four-way split among circuits that emphasize 
the mootness doctrine, deny the existence of jurisdiction, allow jurisdiction 
but refuse relief, and that provide full relief under valid jurisdiction.48 
II. Current Circuit Precedents: A Four-Way Rift 
A. The Tenth Circuit Applies the Mootness-Doctrine Approach 
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of jurisdiction in the unpublished 
decision of Awe v. Napolitano.49 In Awe, the court determined that the suit 
failed to present a case or controversy because the Immigration Services 
removal proceedings rendered the naturalization appeal moot.50  
Ahmed Awe became a legal permanent resident of the United States in 
1968.51 In 1976, when Awe was eighteen years old, he was convicted of 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Kirk L. Peterson, Note, “Final” Orders of Deportation, Motions to Reopen and 
Reconsider, and Tolling Under the Judicial Review Provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 439, 441-42 (1994). 
 44. Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 45. See, e.g., Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 46. See, e.g., Klene, 697 F.3d at 667-69. 
 47. See, e.g., De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 48. Klene, 697 F.3d at 667-68. 
 49. 494 F. App’x 860 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 50. Id. at 866. 
 51. Id. at 861. 
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burglary.52 Seven years later he pleaded guilty to multiple drug charges, but 
the Oklahoma governor ultimately pardoned him for this conviction in 
2006.53 Following the pardon, in 2007, Awe applied for naturalization.54 
Nonetheless, Immigration Services determined—based on the pardoned 
drug conviction—that Awe belonged to the class of removable aliens, per a 
statutory requirement of good moral character, and denied his application.55  
In May 2010, Awe filed a petition with the district court for review of the 
denial of his naturalization application.56 While his application was 
pending, in August 2010, Immigration Services placed Awe in removal 
proceedings, based again on his pardoned 1983 drug conviction.57 The State 
then filed a motion to dismiss the district court case, arguing that pursuant 
to the Limiting Section, the initiation of removal proceedings precluded the 
court’s proper exercise of jurisdiction.58 The court agreed, holding in effect, 
that plaintiff Awe had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.59 The district court subsequently determined that the Limiting 
Section would prevent the court from remanding with instructions for the 
agency to naturalize.60 Therefore, the court dismissed the action in 
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).61 
Although, like the district court, the Tenth Circuit ultimately dismissed 
the case without prejudice, it rejected the lower court’s reasoning.62 The 
Tenth Circuit’s opinion surveyed the relevant case law issuing from other 
circuits, stating, “Several circuits . . . have concluded that § 1429 [Limiting 
Section] does not strip jurisdiction, agreeing that the plain terms of the 
statute prohibit only the Attorney General . . . from considering a 
naturalization application when removal proceedings are pending against an 
alien.”63 The court further recognized the four circuits that have reached 
such a conclusion have nonetheless held that courts are precluded from 
granting relief in cases involving open removal proceedings, due to the 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 861-62. 
 54. Id. at 862. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 863.  
 61. Id. at 862-63. 
 62. Id. at 866-67. 
 63. Id. at 863. 
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ultimate effect of the Limiting Section.64 The Tenth Circuit agreed that the 
Limiting Section does not function to invalidate district court jurisdiction 
over naturalization application reviews and concluded along with the four 
aforementioned circuits “that removal proceedings, whether in process at 
the time a § 1421(c) [Granting Section] petition is filed or initiated 
thereafter, effectively bar federal consideration . . . by virtue of § 1429 
[Limiting Section].”65 It reached this result, however, upon the “Doctrine of 
Constitutional Mootness” and not upon the lower court’s application of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).66  
Specifically, then, the Tenth Circuit held that a district court order to 
Immigration Services to grant plaintiff Awe’s naturalization application 
could not be effective, due to the Limiting Section’s prohibition on 
Immigration Services action during open removal proceedings.67 Thus, 
because such an order would be ineffective, the court articulated that 
“removal proceedings constituted a ‘change of circumstances’ that 
precluded any ‘conclusive’ or ‘specific relief.’”68 Furthermore, the court 
determined that even if Awe had requested declaratory relief, that request 
would be similarly moot.69 The court reached this conclusion because, 
pursuant to the Limiting Section, even a court declaration could not enable 
the agency to act on a  naturalization request while removal proceedings 
were pending.70  
Although the Tenth Circuit recognized that disallowing district court 
review could allow Immigration Services to evade judicial review by 
opening removal proceedings after any denial of a naturalization 
application, the court decided that consideration of this difficulty falls 
within the purview of Congress and not the courts.71  
B. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits Apply the Lack-of-Jurisdiction Approach  
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have interpreted the Limiting Section even 
more stringently than the Tenth Circuit. That is, these courts have taken the 
Limiting language to mean that removal proceedings directly deprive 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 865.  
 66. Id. at 865-66. 
 67. Id. at 866. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 866-67. 
 70. Id at 866. 
 71. Id. at 867. 
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district courts of the subject-matter jurisdiction required to hear 
naturalization appeals.72  
1. Fifth Circuit 
In Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction in a case involving a Nigerian resident alien 
seeking review of the denial of his naturalization application.73 Appellant 
Kehinde Saba-Bakare became a legal permanent resident of the United 
States in early 1986.74 When, in April 2003, Saba-Bakare attempted to 
reenter the United States following a brief trip, immigration authorities took 
note of a previous second-degree sexual assault conviction and refused to 
readmit Saba-Bakare.75 Removal proceedings began that day.76 During the 
pendency of these proceedings, Saba-Bakare filed a naturalization 
application with Immigration Services and a motion to terminate the 
removal proceedings with an immigration judge.77 Following the 
immigration judge’s denial of the motion, Immigration Services denied 
Saba-Bakare’s naturalization application, despite the fact that a removal 
proceeding remained open and the Limiting Section should have functioned 
to prevent such a ruling.78  
Consequently, Saba-Bakare initiated a federal suit, requesting de novo 
review of his application—as the Granting Section expressly permits—and 
a declaratory judgment of his prima facie eligibility for naturalization.79 
The district court “vacated [Immigration Service]’s decision denying Saba-
Bakare’s application for naturalization” and remanded the application for 
Immigration Services to consider only once removal proceedings had 
closed, thereby acknowledging the mandate of the Limiting Section.80 The 
district court denied Saba-Bakare’s request for declaratory judgment, 
however, stating that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissing all 
of the claims it had not remanded.81  
                                                                                                                 
 72. See, e.g., Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 805-06 (4th Cir. 2010); Saba-Bakare v. 
Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 73. 507 F.3d at 340-42. 
 74. Id. at 338. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 339. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. at 340. 
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination 
that it lacked valid jurisdiction over Saba-Bakare’s remaining claims, 
specifically considering and rejecting three proposed sources of 
jurisdiction: the Granting Section, the Declaration Regulation, and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(b).82  
First, the court addressed Saba-Bakare’s contention that the Granting 
Section gave the court the ability to rule on his naturalization application by 
establishing district court review of application denials.83 The circuit court 
drew attention to the fact that the Granting Section constrains courts’ 
reviewing authority to that of denials of naturalization, and “[a]s the initial 
denial of [Saba-Bakare’s] application ha[d] no continuing legal effect, 
neither it nor the underlying findings of the [Immigration Services could] 
be reviewed.”84 That is, because Immigration Services improperly denied 
Saba-Bakare’s application while a removal proceeding was pending, there 
existed no valid denial for the circuit court to review.  
Second, the court held that, when an administrative delay is necessary 
because of the Limiting Section’s requirements, that delay will not satisfy 
the 120-day window referenced in 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).85 Thus, the district 
court may not maintain jurisdiction on these grounds.86  
Third, the court addressed Saba-Bakare’s request for a declaration of 
prima facie eligibility pursuant to the Declaration Regulation.87 Under this 
regulation, an immigration judge may terminate a removal proceeding, 
thereby enabling an alien to proceed to a final naturalization hearing if that 
alien (1) establishes prima facie eligibility and (2) presents “exceptionally 
appealing or humanitarian factors.”88  
Prior to the 1990 amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act, the Board of Immigration Appeals held, in In re Cruz, that “‘prima 
facie eligibility may be established by an affirmative communication from 
[Immigration Services] or by a declaration of a court.’”89 The Saba-Bakare 
court, however, determined that “in light of the 1990 amendment to § 1421 
[Granting Section], In re Cruz indicates that only an affirmative 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 340-41. 
 83. Id. at 340. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 340-41.  
 88. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2014). 
 89. Saba-Bakare, 507 F.3d at 341 (quoting In re Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 236, 237 (B.I.A. 
1975)). 
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communication from [Immigration Services] may establish prima facie 
eligibility.”90  
In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit effectively held that Immigration Services 
may sidestep review of a naturalization application denial by declining to 
rule on the application and initiating removal proceedings within 120 
days.91 Under the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Saba-Bakare, (1) district 
courts cannot review a naturalization application without a previous denial, 
where the simple initiation of removal proceedings will ensure such a 
denial will never be necessary, and (2) only Immigration Services itself 
may make a determination of prima facie eligibility for naturalization.92 
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit may have replaced the previous “race” to 
deport with a waiting game of sorts, in which Immigration Services may 
use strategic timing to entirely deny an immigrant any meaningful 
naturalization appeal.  
That is not to say that the Fifth Circuit failed to consider the equitable 
ramifications of its decision. In fact, it acknowledged that without the 
possibility of district court review, an Immigration Services finding that an 
alien lacks prima facie eligibility could “render the . . . eligibility issue 
unreviewable by any court” and called this point “Saba-Bakare’s most 
compelling argument.”93 Nonetheless, the court reiterated what it 
considered to be a correct interpretation of the existing statutory framework 
and stated that even a “persuasive equitable concern” would be an issue for 
Congress to resolve and not an appropriate means by which to establish 
jurisdiction in these cases.94 
2. Fourth Circuit 
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit, in Barnes v. Holder, held that any right to a 
district court review that plaintiff Barnes had under the Granting Section 
was subject to the boundaries the Limiting Section established.95 Barnes, 
who had been a permanent resident of the United States since 1979, was 
convicted of a drug crime in 1982 while serving in the U.S. Army.96 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. at 341 (citing In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2007)). 
 91. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(c) (2012) (allowing district courts de novo review power over 
naturalizations that the Attorney General denied or failed to make a determination upon 
within 120 days).  
 92. Id. at 341-42. 
 93. Id. at 341. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 625 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 96. Id. at 802. 
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Twenty-two years later, in 2004, Immigration Services began removal 
proceedings against Barnes, based on the 1982 conviction.97 Barnes filed a 
motion with an immigration judge, requesting a termination of removal 
proceedings pursuant to the Declaration Regulation.98 The immigration 
judge denied this motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, 
dismissing Barnes’ appeal.99  
In assessing Barnes’ subsequent appeal to the federal courts, the Fourth 
Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Fifth and held that In re Hidalgo 
correctly characterized the state of the Declaration Regulation following the 
1990 statutory amendments.100 In In re Hidalgo, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals held that courts could no longer make declarations of prima facie 
eligibility for naturalization, as the attorney general now holds exclusive 
authority over naturalization.101 The Fourth Circuit then addressed Barnes’ 
assertion that the Granting Section firmly provided a right to judicial review 
by holding that any such right possibly granted is curtailed by the Limiting 
Section.102 The court reached this conclusion by referencing canons of 
construction that require harmonious readings where possible103 and stating 
that such a reading of the Granting and Limiting Sections yields “the 
conclusion that an alien has a statutory right to review of his naturalization 
application, unless he is in removal proceedings.”104 The court suggested 
this was the natural, logical conclusion, as a lack of right to initial 
adjudication must result in a lack of right to judicial review.105  
Thus, in both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, district courts lack subject-
matter jurisdiction to review denied naturalization applications when a 
removal proceeding is pending.106  
C. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits Apply the Lack-of-Remedy 
Approach 
In contrast to the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits have held that district courts do, in fact, retain valid subject-matter 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 802-03. 
 99. Id. at 803. 
 100. Id. at 805-07. 
 101. In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 102. Barnes, 625 F.3d at 806. 
 103. Id. (citing United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. at 806-07. 
 106. Id. at 807-08; Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2007).  
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jurisdiction.107 Nonetheless, these circuits have determined that district 
courts have no power to offer effective relief, holding that removal 
proceedings will prevent a remedy and require that “judgment must go for 
the agency on the merits.”108 In other words, these three circuits have 
determined that, despite valid subject-matter jurisdiction, they can neither 
remand with instructions to the attorney general—as the Limiting Section 
does prevent agency action even where it does not so burden the court—nor 
make an appropriate and effective declaration.109  
1. Sixth Circuit 
In Zayed v. United States, the Sixth Circuit heard the appeal of Dalal 
Zayed.110 Zayed was admitted to the United States in 1991 as the unmarried 
daughter of a lawful permanent resident.111 Then, in 1996, Zayed applied 
for naturalization.112 On her application, Zayed stated that she resided with 
her parents from 1988 until 1991.113 In addition, she stated that she and her 
husband had divorced in 1988 before remarrying in 1992.114 During its 
investigation of Zayed’s application, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (the predecessor of today’s agency) discovered that Zayed had 
resided with her husband for at least two years while the couple was 
purportedly divorced.115 After determining that Zayed’s application 
responses were false, along with the possibility that her divorce was a 
“sham . . . to obtain lawful permanent residence [in the United States] as an 
unmarried daughter,” the agency informed Zayed of its intention to deny 
her naturalization application.116 Following the official denial and the 
exhaustion of administrative appeal procedures, Zayed filed a petition for 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ajlani v. 
Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008); De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1047 
(9th Cir. 2004); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 905-06 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 108. Klene, 697 F.3d at 667; see also Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 238-41; Zayed, 368 F.3d at 905-
06; Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1047. 
 109. See Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 237-41; Zayed, 368 F.3d at 905-07; Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 
1045-47. 
 110. 368 F.3d at 904. 
 111. Id. at 903. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 904. 
 116. Id. 
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review with the district court.117 The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service began removal proceedings soon after.118  
The district court dismissed Zayed’s petition on the theory that it lacked 
jurisdiction, pursuant to the Limiting Section.119 The court used a 
purposivist approach to statutory interpretation and concluded that 
Congress actually intended to continue “‘to emphasize deportation 
proceedings over the naturalization process’” and to prevent any 
consideration of naturalization applications during the pendency of open 
removal proceedings.120  
Although the Sixth Circuit reached the same result as the district court, 
dismissing Zayed’s petition without prejudice, it did so on different 
grounds. The Sixth Circuit, after briefly establishing appellate jurisdiction 
as a general matter,121 established valid subject-matter jurisdiction based 
upon the Granting Section.122 Contrary to the reasoning of the district court, 
the Sixth Circuit found it “difficult to square the agency’s response with the 
plain language” of the Limiting Section as “[b]y its terms, the statute limits 
the authority of ‘the Attorney General’—not the authority of the district 
courts—to act on applications for naturalization.”123 The court did, 
however, take the time to underscore the reasonableness of the district 
court’s conclusion, noting that the 1990 statutory language does appear to 
preserve Congress’ formerly established prioritization of removal 
proceedings over naturalization proceedings.124 Despite its decision to 
acknowledge and maintain the priority of removal proceedings, the Sixth 
Circuit held that it did not “read the amended [Limiting Section] as 
divesting the district courts of the jurisdiction granted under [the Granting 
Section].”125  
The court did not end its analysis there, however, but continued to 
analyze the effects of the Limiting Section on courts’ ability to effectively 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (“Adopting the approach to statutory interpretation urged upon it by the 
government . . . the district court elected to follow what it saw as the true intent of Congress 
without necessarily adhering to the letter of the statutory language.”). 
 121. Id. at 904-05 (“We have jurisdiction of Ms. Zayed’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
the appeal having been taken from a final decision of the district court.”). 
 122. Id. at 905-06. 
 123. Id. at 905. 
 124. Id. at 905-06. 
 125. Id. at 906. 
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provide relief.126 Specifically, the court determined that the statutory 
language prevented the district court from either ordering the attorney 
general to naturalize Zayed or granting the application itself.127 
2. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit held similarly in Ajlani v. Chertoff, deciding that 
there was no available relief.128 In that case, Majed Ajlani, a Syrian 
national, entered the United States in 1987 and gained lawful permanent 
resident status in 1996 through his marriage to a U.S. citizen.129 Despite the 
fact that Ajlani picked up four convictions—for forgery, false reporting, 
trespass, and fraud—during his twenty years in the United States, 
Immigration Services granted his naturalization application in 2006.130 
After his application was approved, but before he could take his oath of 
allegiance, Ajlani exited and attempted to reenter the United States via 
Canada.131 The event caused border officials to examine Ajlani’s status, and 
Immigration Services soon opened removal proceedings.132  
After a string of conflicting agency actions (e.g. notifying Ajlani of his 
naturalization oath opportunity before intercepting him at the oath 
ceremony with service of process), Immigration Services ultimately 
reopened Ajlani’s naturalization proceedings and began moving forward 
with removal proceedings.133 Ajlani brought an action in the district court, 
acting pro se and making several claims, including a request for a judicial 
order to either compel a hearing upon or grant his naturalization.134 The 
district court dismissed the case, pointing to Ajlani’s failure to “state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted” under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).135  
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s analysis, 
holding, in relevant part, that (1) subject-matter jurisdiction was valid under 
the Granting Section, but (2) the “scope of the court’s review” and capacity 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Id. at 906-07 (“The fact that the statute precludes the relief sought requires this 
result. . . . The petition having been dismissed without prejudice, Ms. Zayed will have an 
opportunity to file a new petition if she prevails in the removal proceedings.”). 
 127. Id. at 906. 
 128. 545 F.3d 229, 229-30 (2008). 
 129. Id. at 231. 
 130. Id. at 231-32. 
 131. Id. at 232. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 232-33. 
 134. Id. at 233. 
 135. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss3/4
2015]       COMMENTS 575 
 
 
to offer remedies was circumscribed by the Limiting Section so as to render 
the claim invalid under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) while 
removal proceedings were pending.136 The Attorney General cannot grant 
naturalization when the Limiting Section forbids it.137 This, in turn, 
prohibits the district courts from ordering such relief, because the “district 
court’s authority to grant naturalization under [the Granting Section] could 
not be greater than that of the Attorney General.”138 The Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ajlani’s case, upholding the 
district court’s reasoning that Ajlani failed to state a claim for which 
“naturalization relief could be granted while removal proceedings were 
pending.”139 
3. Ninth Circuit 
The Second Circuit’s analysis comports with that of the Ninth Circuit, 
which held in De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen that pending removal 
proceedings do not undermine subject-matter jurisdiction but do limit the 
scope of review possible.140 In De Lara Bellajaro, a Filipino man in the 
United States as a lawful permanent resident was convicted of a sex crime, 
imprisoned, and subsequently paroled.141 In 1986, De Lara Bellajaro 
violated the terms of his parole by temporarily returning to his home 
country.142  Following his return to the United States, and after the 
expiration of his parole, De Lara Bellajaro reapplied for naturalization in 
1994.143 In 1999, Immigration Services denied De Lara Bellajaro’s 
naturalization application for “failure to establish good moral character” 
and began removal proceedings.144 De Lara Bellajaro filed yet another 
application for naturalization, as well as a motion to terminate the removal 
proceeding.145 Immigration Services rejected both his application for 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 238 (quoting Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 137. See id. at 239.   
 138. Id. (“Thus, if § 1429 would preclude the Attorney General from granting 
naturalization to an alien because of pending removal proceedings, an alien could not secure 
that relief from a district court pursuant to § 1421(c).” (citing Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 232 F. 
Supp. 2d 415, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2002))).  
 139. Id. at 241. The claim was not dismissed, notably, for lack of jurisdiction. Id. 
 140. 378 F.3d 1042, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 141. Id. at 1044. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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naturalization and his motion to terminate, after which De Lara Bellajaro’s 
appealed to the district court.146  
The district court pointed to the congressional prioritization of removal 
over naturalization, opining that a comparative interpretation of the 
Granting and Limiting Sections required such prioritization, and reasoned 
that “[congressional] intent would be frustrated if judicial review of 
naturalization decisions were available under [the Granting Section] while 
the removal proceeding is pending.”147 
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of De 
Lara Bellajaro’s appeal, it did so for different reasons.148 The Ninth Circuit 
validated federal district courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction over these cases, 
declaring that the Granting Section “plainly confers” such jurisdiction and 
that there is “no textual basis for concluding that jurisdiction vested in 
district courts by [the Granting Section] is divested by [the Limiting 
Section].”149 The circuit court clarified that grant of jurisdiction, however, 
by explaining that the scope of review provided in the Granting Section is 
limited to the denial of a naturalization application.150 The court further 
stated that where—as in this case—such denial was premised upon the 
pendency of removal proceedings, courts may not expand their review 
power to declarations of eligibility for naturalization.151  
In this vein, the Ninth Circuit denied De Lara Bellajaro’s request for a 
declaration of prima facie eligibility to support the termination of his 
removal proceedings, saying that such declaration would be nothing more 
than advice, since “discretion to prosecute and to adjudicate removal 
proceedings is reposed exclusively in the Attorney General.”152 The court 
then declined to make any such “advisory” declaration and, consequently, 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal for reasons of limited scope and 
unavailability of remedy.153 
  
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 1043. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1043, 1046. 
 150. Id. at 1046-47.  
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1047 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 
471, 487 (1999)). 
 153. Id. at 1047. 
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D. The Third and Seventh Circuits Apply the Declaratory-Judgment 
Approach 
In Klene, the Seventh Circuit joined the Third Circuit, holding that 
removal proceedings do not affect federal subject-matter jurisdiction and 
that in these cases, district courts may grant the remedy of a declaratory 
judgment.154  
1. Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit considered the issue in Gonzalez v. Secretary of 
Department of Homeland Security, in which Jose Gonzalez appealed the 
district court’s dismissal of his petition for review of a denial of 
naturalization.155 Gonzalez entered the United States as a non-immigrant 
visitor in the late 1990s and subsequently married a U.S. citizen.156 During 
a 2004 interview in support of his Form I-751 petition to convert his lawful 
permanent resident status from conditional to non-conditional, Gonzalez 
stated under oath that he had no children.157 After the lifting of his 
conditional status, Gonzalez and his wife divorced, and he moved in with 
Margarete Picinin, with whom he had been romantically involved during 
his marriage.158 In 2005, Gonzalez amended the birth certificates of 
Picinin’s two young children to indicate he was the father.159 He also listed 
the two minors as his children on a 2006 naturalization application, and in 
light of this inconsistency, Immigration Services denied his application, 
issuing a final denial in 2009.160  
Twelve days after this denial, Immigration Services initiated removal 
proceedings, and Gonzalez appealed the denial to the federal district 
court.161 The court dismissed Gonzalez’ appeal in light of the 
“‘uncontradicted evidence . . . that [Gonzalez], while under penalty of 
perjury, gave false evidence in order to receive a benefit in an immigration 
proceeding.’”162  
                                                                                                                 
 154. Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 260 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 155. 678 F.3d at 255-56. 
 156. Id. at 256. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 256-57 (quoting Gonzalez v. Napolitano, No. 2:09-cv-03426, 2011 WL 
941299, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2011)). 
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On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling.163 First, 
the circuit court asserted that the district court had valid jurisdiction to hear 
and decide the claim.164 The court traced the history and development of the 
current statutory language and concluded that “[b]ased on the plain 
language of the statute, we concur with the Ninth Circuit that there is ‘no 
textual basis for concluding that jurisdiction vested in district courts by § 
1421(c) [(Granting Section)] is divested by § 1429 [(Limiting 
Section)].’”165  
In the second portion of its analysis, however, the Third Circuit diverged 
from the Ninth.166  When it addressed whether a district court can offer 
effective relief in these situations, the Third Circuit observed the apparent 
congressional prioritization of removal proceedings over naturalization 
proceedings and stated that the 1990 amendments did not alter this 
priority.167 The court further acknowledged that district courts lacked the 
power to offer relief in the form of ordering the Attorney General to 
naturalize an alien with pending removal proceedings.168 Nonetheless, the 
court recognized the viability of declaratory judgments as meaningful 
relief.169  
In permitting declaratory relief, the Third Circuit countered two issues 
that the Sixth Circuit raised in Zayed.170 First, the Third Circuit addressed 
the issue of whether district courts could make authoritative declarations of 
prima facie eligibility for naturalization in regard to the Declaration 
Regulation.171 Despite the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ruling in In re 
Hidalgo, wherein the Board determined that affirmative declarations as to 
prima facie eligibility were squarely—and solely—within agency 
discretion, the Third Circuit suggested that In re Cruz remains good law, 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 264. 
 164. Id. at 257. 
 165. Id. at 257-58 (quoting De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
 166. Id. at 258-59 (“The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the district court could 
not review the denial of naturalization . . . because, while § 1429 did not remove the court’s 
jurisdiction, it did limit the scope of review. . . . Having decided that district courts have 
jurisdiction, we must now address the more difficult issue of what, if any, relief a district 
court may grant.”) 
 167. Id. at 259. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 259-60. 
 170. Id. at 259-61. 
 171. Id. at 260-61. 
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even after the 1990 statutory amendments.172 Under In re Cruz, either 
Immigration Services or a court may make such a declaration.173 In 
Gonzalez the Third Circuit stated, “We are confident that the [Board of 
Immigration Appeals] would . . . accept the declaration of a district court 
properly exercising its jurisdiction under [the Granting Section].”174 Despite 
this assertion, however, the court clarified that it rested its endorsement of 
declaratory judgment on a more fundamental basis: judicial ability to effect 
congressional intent.175  
Specifically, the court held that “[d]eclaratory relief strikes a balance 
between the petitioner’s right to full judicial review as preserved by [the 
Granting Section] and the priority of removal proceedings enshrined in [the 
Limiting Section],” as Congress clearly granted district courts the power to 
conduct de novo reviews of application denials.176 In other words, the court 
held that any other result would “raise[] the possibility that review may be 
cut off by the actions of the Attorney General. . . . Such a possibility is 
contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in the structure of the 
statute.”177 
Second, the court opined that declaratory relief would not undermine the 
prioritization of removal.178 This is so because a declaration of prima facie 
eligibility for naturalization contributes to the record available for the 
removal proceeding but does not violate congressional intent by prioritizing 
naturalization over removal in any way.179 In describing this effect, the 
Third Circuit held that declaratory relief preserved Congress’ two 
“mandated goals, a de novo review process and the elimination of the race 
to the courthouse.”180 
2. Seventh Circuit 
Like the Third Circuit in Gonzalez, the Seventh Circuit in Klene found 
that district courts have valid subject-matter jurisdiction because the 
statutory limitation on the Attorney General does not deprive a court of 
jurisdiction.181 In that case, Trinidad Klene, a native of the Philippines, 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Id. at 260. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 260-61. 
 176. Id. at 260. 
 177. Id. at 261. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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lawfully resided in the United States after her marriage to a U.S. citizen.182 
Immigration Services denied her application for naturalization, concluding 
that her marriage had been fraudulent.183 Klene appealed the denial to the 
district court, pursuant to the Granting Section, and Immigration Services 
subsequently opened removal proceedings.184 Immigration Services 
requested the court dismiss the suit, arguing that the Limiting Section 
required the court to do so.185 The district court agreed with the agency and 
dismissed Klene’s suit.186 
Klene appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit, which 
drew a distinction between “[w]hat the Attorney General may do—and 
derivatively what a court may order the Attorney General to do” and 
jurisdiction itself.187 It did so by stating that the Attorney General’s 
authority “concerns the merits . . . [and] there is a fundamental difference 
between mandatory rules, such as the one in § 1429, and jurisdictional 
limits,” which Congress crafted to expressly include the authority to 
“decide whether aliens are entitled to naturalization” in these cases.188  
The Klene court also espoused declaratory relief as a valid means of 
court action,189 stating that the “approach preserves the alien’s entitlement 
under [the Granting Section] to an independent judicial decision while 
respecting the limit that [the Limiting Section] places on the Attorney 
General’s powers.”190 The court further acknowledged that appellate review 
is deferential and while “[t]he existence of overlapping proceedings does 
not diminish a district court’s power[,] . . . [it] does present a question on 
which the judge should exercise sound discretion.”191 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit remanded with instructions to decide whether declaratory judgment 
would be appropriate in this particular case.192  
Finally, Klene responded to the issue of mootness, on which the Tenth 
Circuit based its decision in Awe.193 The Klene court held that mootness 
was not an issue, as there exists in this case and others a valid case or 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Id. at 667. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 668.  
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 668-69. 
 190. Id. at 669. 
 191. Id. at 669-70. 
 192. Id. at 670. 
 193. Id. at 668. 
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controversy: “[P]arties are locked in conflict . . . . If Klene is right, she can 
become a citizen; if the agency is right, Klene [cannot] . . . . Parallel civil 
proceedings are common[, and] . . . [u]ntil one of the proceedings reaches 
judgment, neither makes the other moot. . . .”194 
Thus, the Klene court appropriately decided the issue in light of 
congressional intent and sound policy.  
III. Suggested Approach: Valid Jurisdiction Allows Declaratory Judgments 
The Third and Seventh Circuits adopted the correct approach to 
interpreting the interaction between the Granting and Limiting Sections as 
amended. Maintaining valid jurisdiction for federal courts to conduct de 
novo review over denials of naturalization applications is not only proper, 
but it is also the best option in light of procedural, practical, and policy-
based concerns. 
A. Procedural Concerns Support Jurisdiction 
The 1990 amendment to the Limiting Section had no effect on federal 
jurisdiction:  
Nothing in the [Granting Section] limits the jurisdiction so 
conferred . . . . By the same token, the text of [the Limiting 
Section] . . . clearly applies to the Attorney General. There is no 
hint in the language of [the Limiting Section] that it also applies 
to the courts.195  
This is the result that a plain reading and direct interpretation of 
Congress’ language effects. Both a reading of the text itself and a look at its 
underlying purpose reveal a congressional intent to provide de novo review 
in the federal court system to all immigrants whose naturalization 
applications have been denied. The text of the Granting Section states that 
such immigrants “may seek review” and goes so far as to say that these 
reviews will occur “de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.”196 The phrasing is decisive. The standard of 
review is generous. The option to place limits or exceptions upon the grant 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Id. 
 195. De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Klene, 
697 F.3d at 668. 
 196. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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is unexercised. As the majority of circuits that have spoken to the issue 
have found, the grant of jurisdiction is unequivocal.197 
This textual interpretation is clear, and a purpose-based reading of the 
statute only cements the conclusion that valid federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction exists. Congress’ 1990 update to the statutory scheme 
authorized this robust review avenue at the same time that it removed 
naturalization authority from the courts.198 This conscious decision to 
preserve the judiciary’s role in the process, despite Immigration Service’s 
new role, demonstrates what others have identified as an intentionally 
“bicameral approach to the naturalization process.”199 Congress explicitly 
directed the language of the Limiting Section at the Attorney General, not 
the courts,200 and applying that limitation to the judiciary would effect a 
massive exception nowhere indicated in the statute itself. Thus, allowing 
the section to divest courts of jurisdiction requires a skewed interpretation 
of the Granting Section.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s articulation of the deference due to 
agency interpretations of statutes supports valid jurisdiction.201 In Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,202 the Court 
explained the proper judicial approach in these situations:  
When a court reviews an agency’s construction . . . [f]irst, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.203  
This “unambiguously expressed intent” is manifest in both the statute and 
the congressional record that supports it.204 The Act’s sponsor, 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See supra Part III. Of the six circuits that have refused to rule on these cases, four 
have done so because of a lack of remedy and not because of a perceived lack of jurisdiction. 
See supra Part III.  
 198. See supra Part II.B. 
 199. Daniel Makled, Note, De Novo: A Proposed Compromise to Closing the 
Naturalization Review Loophole, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 367, 376 (2013). 
 200. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (“[N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the 
Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  
 201. Makled, supra note 199, at 375. 
 202. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 203. Id. at 842-43. 
 204. Makled, supra note 199, at 375-77. 
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Representative Morrison, clarified that the Act would “‘not take away any 
of the judicial review rights accorded applicants today.’”205 In addition, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee expressed its strong belief that “‘although few 
cases for naturalization have been denied, citizenship is the most valued 
governmental benefit of this land and applicants should receive full 
recourse to the [j]udiciary when the request for that benefit is denied.’”206 
This clear legislative intent counsels in favor of maintenance of valid 
jurisdiction. 
Finally, it is the judiciary’s duty to fully and fairly exercise the 
jurisdiction Congress has seen fit to grant it.207 And it is squarely within this 
duty to protect the methods of justice, generally, and of due process, 
specifically.208  
B. Practical Considerations Reinforce Jurisdiction 
The retention of federal subject-matter jurisdiction in naturalization cases 
is not only consistent with statutory language, but it also addresses 
overarching concerns209 by promoting structural efficiency and efficacy. 
Academics have identified at least five intersecting sources of difficulty 
within immigration adjudication: “substantive immigration law; the 
conflicting signals of immigration adjudication; the lack of de facto 
independence; the use of diversions from the system; and weakened judicial 
review.”210 Nonetheless, this Comment endeavors to examine a particular 
struggle in the realm of immigration law that—though narrow in scope—
carries weighty and immediate consequences for the individual immigrants 
affected, as well as enduring consequences for views on the judiciary’s role 
in the process. Immigration law functions primarily in the legislative and 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Id. at 377 (quoting 135 CONG. REC. 16996 (1989) (statement of Rep. Morrison)). 
 206. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 14 (1989)). 
 207. The federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them,” as the Supreme Court has long recognized “the principle that 
‘When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, 
it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.’” Colo. River Water Conserv’n Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 464-
65 (1964) (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)). 
 208. For cogent arguments on the due process concerns at play in the naturalization 
process, see Josh Adams, Federal Court Jurisdiction over Visa Revocations, 32 VT. L. REV. 
291, 308-13 (2007); Makled, supra note 199, at 386. 
 209. Many of these concerns are addressed in other articles. See, e.g., infra notes 210-
211, 213. 
 210. Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the 
Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 542 (2011) [hereinafter Family, 
Beyond Decisional Independence]. 
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executive branches; so far as Congress has deemed it appropriate to involve 
the judicial branch, the courts should take up that legislated mantle 
willingly, as they are uniquely positioned to act in ways both independent 
of political pressure and responsive to an ever-developing field.  
In particular, one of the more cited concerns in discussions of 
immigration adjudication, whether regarding agency judges or Article III 
courts, is that of appeal rates and docket effects.211 Between 2002 and 2006, 
administrative adjudication appeals increased from 6 percent to 29 percent 
of immigration cases,212 and immigration appeals grew to represent 
approximately 20 percent of the federal court of appeals docket.213 While 
the steadily increasing number of cases appearing on many courts’ dockets 
is a substantial concern, a refusal to exercise valid jurisdiction (whether by 
holding jurisdiction invalid or by declaring relief to be unavailable) is 
neither an appropriate vehicle for managing docket effects nor the best 
approach to the problem at large.  
First, these discussions of docket effects look at the entire field of 
immigration appeals arising from administrative rulings, not solely at cases 
involving denied naturalization applications coupled with open removal 
proceedings.214 Second, while some scholars argue that there is too little 
transparency in the field to say with certainty why the surge in appeals has 
occurred,215 other scholars have attributed the increase to inadequate 
administrative adjudication proceedings.216 Judge Posner, for one, has 
directly stated, “The rise in federal appeals was the result of ‘the fact that 
the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below 
the minimum standards of legal justice.’”217 Third, courts hearing and 
ruling upon appeals could eventually contribute to efficiency within the 
process, as patterns of affirmations and reversals within federal courts may 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See, e.g., David C. Koelsch, Follow the North Star: Canada as a Model to Increase 
the Independence, Integrity and Efficiency of the U.S. Immigration Adjudication System, 25 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 763, 779-83 (2011). 
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gradually begin to shape decisions of the originating judges, while 
providing much-needed clarity on the bases of decisions.218  
As some have observed, it is largely the “harshness, complexity, and 
opacity of substantive immigration law” that fuels the creation of excess 
adjudication and gives rise to “huge backlogs in the system.”219 In 
particular, recent “streamlining” attempted by internal agency action has 
decreased the availability of clear adjudication to immigrants with cases 
from immigration judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals.220 
Previously, the Board heard cases in three-member panels, but in 1999, a 
pilot program began allowing the Board to hear cases as individual judges 
and to rule on cases without providing opinions.221 The lack of legal 
opinions not only increases the likelihood that individual litigants will be 
unsatisfied with their adjudicative experience,222 but also lacks the benefit 
of issue clarification and well-grounded predictability. 
Greater clarity and public transparency would likely provide the benefit 
of greater confidence in the adjudicative process,223 while allowing 
immigrants and their counsel to make better-informed decisions about when 
and how to pursue appeals. In fact, increased transparency might even 
encourage more lawyers to enter the currently under-served practice area224 
and aid in providing more equal accessibility to diverse immigrant 
demographics.225 If these effects were achieved, they would contribute to 
greater efficiency at a fundamental level—a permanent and preferable 
solution to the current burden on appellate courts. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 218. Benson, supra note 213, at 431-32.  
 219. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence, supra note 210, at 542. 
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45, 47, 52-54 (2011). 
 224. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence, supra note 210, at 542. 
 225. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
586 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:559 
 
 
C. Policy Concerns Bolster Jurisdiction 
Even acknowledging, as circuit courts have, a congressional intent to 
prioritize removal proceedings over naturalization proceedings, allowing 
district courts to make declaratory judgments does not offend the intent 
underlying the Limiting Section.226 In fact, allowing courts to make these 
judgments reinforces the intent that underlies the appeals process that the 
Granting Section clearly establishes.227 For reasons discussed,228 it is 
improbable that Congress’ intent in crafting the appellate opportunity in the 
Granting Section was to provide a brand of jurisdiction so tenuous that it 
might be destroyed by strategic acts of the very agency over which review 
was granted.229 
Not only does the exercise of federal subject-matter jurisdiction over 
these cases fall squarely within Congress’ intent—as indicated by the 
statute, its history, and the legislative record—but the exercise of such 
jurisdiction also addresses broader policy concerns. As a number of 
legislators, commentators, and scholars have observed, many difficulties 
and flaws complicate the United States’ immigration system.230 Systemic 
problems such as administrative delays,231 unsatisfactory agency appeals 
processes,232 and a lack of clarity233 threaten the efficacy and fairness of the 
naturalization process. Although the involvement of Article III courts in the 
process cannot remedy all that ails the system, it would be a significant step 
in the right direction by (1) giving proper consideration to expressed 
congressional intent,234 (2) affirming the courts’ role as protectors of 
judicial process,235 (3) addressing specific practical concerns,236 and (4) 
serving the aims of fairness and faith in the justice system.237  
In other words, at the core of this question of jurisdiction sits “simple 
fairness.”238 Congress, which represents the United States’ citizenry, has 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 905-06 (6th Cir. 2004).  
 227. See supra Part III.A.  
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clearly granted immigrants the right to a meaningful federal court review of 
naturalization denials.239 
IV. Conclusion: Declaratory Judgment Should Prevail as Proper 
The Third and Seventh Circuits’ declaratory relief approach best serves 
the policies embodied in both the Granting and Limiting Sections (§§ 
1421(c) and 1429) by maintaining congressional priorities without 
undermining the statutory grant of review power. As seen by the factual 
outcomes of cases entering the district courts under the Mootness-Doctrine, 
Lack-of-Jurisdiction, and Failure-of-Relief Approaches, any approach other 
than the Declaratory-Relief Approach creates a real possibility that strategic 
agency action will nullify the congressionally crafted grant of jurisdiction 
and meaningful review.  
Because of the procedure clearly outlined in the Granting Statute, the 
practical concerns surrounding the issue, and the manner in which the 
Declaratory Relief Approach navigates competing policy concerns while 
implementing congressional intent, the federal court system should adopt 
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